We provide a nonparametric characterization of a general collective model for multi-person household consumption, which includes externalities and public consumption. We derive the minimum number of commodities and observations that enable the falsi…cation of this general model from aggregate household quantity and price data; these requirements are generally less stringent than the conditions derived by Browning and Chiappori (1998) within a parametric setting. Next, we institute necessary and su¢ cient conditions for data consistency with collective rationality that only include observed price and quantity information. These conditions are formally similar to the GARP condition for the unitary model (see Varian, 1982) ; which is particularly convenient from a practical point of view. To illustrate the generality of the collective model, we also discuss a number of interesting special cases, including the traditional unitary model and the collective labour supply model à la Chiappori (1988).
Introduction
Traditionally, household consumption behaviour is crammed into the so-called unitary approach. This approach assumes that each household acts as if it were a single decision maker; it maximizes a well-behaved (single) utility function subject to a household budget constraint. However, this widely used unitary model has both methodological and empirical de…ciencies. At the methodological level, the approach cannot be …t in Karl Popper's philosophy of science concept of methodological individualism, which states that social theories should run in terms of individuals rather than in terms of groups of individuals (like multi-person households); see, e.g., Blaug (1980) . At the empirical level, which is probably even more important, the unitary model does not seem to …t actually observed household behaviour: theoretical implications such as Slutsky symmetry and negativity have been repeatedly rejected when tested on microdata.
The collective model, which was …rst presented by Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 , provides a valuable alternative to the unitary model. This collective approach explicitly recognizes that the individual household members have own, possibly diverging rational preferences. These individuals are assumed to engage into a bargaining process that results in a Pareto e¢ cient intrahousehold consumption allocation. See Vermeulen (2002) for an introductory overview of the literature that …ts within this collective orientation.
Browning and Chiappori (1998) have provided a general parametric characterization of the collective model of household consumption. They start from the 'minimalistic' assumptions that the empirical analyst cannot determine which commodities are privately and/or publicly consumed within the household, and that the quantities that are privately consumed by the di¤erent household members cannot be observed. In addition, they consider general individual preferences that allow for altruism and other externalities. Their core result for two-person households is that under collectively rational household behaviour the pseudo-Slutsky matrix (i.e., a concept closely related to the Slutsky matrix in the unitary model) can be written as the sum of a symmetric negative semi-de…nite matrix and a rank one matrix. They also generalize this result for households consisting of three and more individuals.
The importance of these theoretical results lies in the fact that they allow for parametric empirical testing of the general collective model. Browning and Chiappori (1998) provide such an application to Canadian data; and their results are particularly favouring the collective approach. First, they obtain that the unitary model is rejected when applied to couples, while it is not rejected for singles. This may indicate a problem with the preference aggregation assumptions that underlie the unitary model, namely that multi-person households behave as single decision makers. Next, they …nd that the data for couples are consistent with the theoretical implications of the collective model. This suggests the collective model as a plausible alternative to the unitary model in the case of multi-person households.
One inherent de…ciency of such a parametric analysis, however, is that it crucially depends on a functional structure that is imposed on the preferences and/or the intrahousehold bargaining process; and that structure is typically non-veri…able. As a result, the parametric tests do not merely check the theoretical restrictions of the model under study, but also the ad-hoc functional speci…cation. Rejections of the unitary restrictions may well be due to ill-speci…cation.
Some researchers take the theory of choice behaviour as granted and non-falsi…able, and consequently use empirical tests of demand theory as a device to check whether a given functional form is appropriate (see also Keuzenkamp and Barten, 1995) . In this paper, we explicitly take the opposite stance, namely that theories of choice behaviour are testable/falsi…able. Therefore, we adopt a nonparametric approach, which analyzes household behaviour without imposing any parametric structure on, e.g., preferences; see, among others, Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) . More speci…cally, it directly tests the adequacy of the theory (expressed in terms of revealed preferences axioms) on the raw price and quantity data. This nonparametric approach was …rst adapted to the collective model by Chiappori (1988) , who restricted attention to labour supply decisions; such a setting involves a number of convenient simpli…cations for the empirical analyst (e.g., observability of individuals'leisure/labour supply and no public consumption).
We speci…cally aim at generalizing Chiappori's work by providing a nonparametric characterization of the collective consumption model à la Browning and Chiappori (1998) , which includes both public consumption and (in casu positive) externalities. A …rst question is whether collective rationality is falsi…able from empirical data under such general conditions. We show in the following sections that this is indeed the case. Speci…cally, we derive the minimum number of consumption commodities and observations that are required for a possible rejection of the collective model. We then compare these minimal empirical requirements to those derived by Browning and Chiappori (1998) within a parametric setting.
Next, we establish operational necessary and su¢ cient conditions for data consistency with collective rationality. These conditions can be conceived as generalizations of the 'Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference' (GARP ) that applies to the unitary model (see Varian, 1982) . This is particularly convenient from an empirical point of view, as it only requires observed prices and aggregate household quantities, and, hence, it does not need recovering unobserved individual consumption information; the latter is the case in the nonparametric conditions established by Chiappori (1988) and tested by Cherchye and Vermeulen (2003) .
Section 2 characterizes the general collective model for two-person households. Section 3 addresses the empirical conditions under which the general collective model is falsi…able. Section 4 institutes the 'observable' necessary and su¢ cient conditions for collective rationality. Section 5 generalizes our main results for many-person households. Section 6 points out some interesting special cases of the general model. Section 7 contains a summary and some concluding remarks. The Appendix contains the proofs of our results.
A general characterization of collective rationality for two-person households
We …rst consider a two-person (1 and 2) household; extensions to M -person households are provided in Section 5. Each household purchases the (non-zero) n-vector of commodities q 2 < n + with corresponding prices p 2 < n ++ . These commodities can be consumed privately, publicly or both. For example, soft drinks are typically privately consumed; each bottle of coke consumed by individual 1 cannot be consumed by individual 2. Conversely, rent is commonly subject to public consumption; consumption by one household member does not a¤ect the other member's consumption possibilities, and -at least if one wants to maintain the household-no individual can be excluded from consumption. Finally, if there are TV programmes that both household members like watching, then part of the expenditures on pay TV are public; the other TV expenditures represent private consumption. In the following, we assume that the empirical analyst cannot determine which commodities are privately and/or publicly consumed.
Generally, the following relationship holds between observed aggregate consumption (q), the unobserved private consumption bundles of each household member (q 1 and q 2 ) and the unobserved public consumption bundle (Q):
The associated household expenditures equal
Following Browning and Chiappori (1998), we adopt a Beckerian framework in which each member has her or his own preferences over the commodities consumed in the household (e.g., Becker, 1991) . Consistent with our nonparametric orientation (which suggests minimal a priori structure), we consider a very general class of preferences: we maintain that an individual's preferences may not only depend on own consumption and public consumption, but also on the other individual's consumption bundle; this allows for altruism and/or externalities. In this respect, we restrict to the case where all externalities are positive (i.e., the so-called purely 'altruistic'case). 1 Formally, this 1 Admittedly, this assumption, which is not needed in a parametric setting (see Browning and Chiappori, 1998), may be restrictive in some instances (e.g., tobacco consumption). However, its restrictive nature should not be overestimated, especially within the speci…c context of a household micro-economy (which di¤ers substantially from that of a macro-level economy). Even though a negative externality may be associated with e.g. tobacco consumption, the non-smoker's positive valuation of the smoker's utility means that the preferences of household member m (m = 1; 2) can be represented by a utility function of the form U m q 1 ; q 2 ; Q that is monotonously increasing in its arguments q 1 , q 2 and Q.
Suppose that we have T household observations; for each observation j 2 f1; :::; T g we use q j and p j to denote the observed quantity and price vector, respectively. (Recall that, in general, the empirical analyst can only observe total quantities, and not the intrahousehold allocation of these quantities to private and public consumption bundles.) Finally, we represent the set of all observations by S = f(q j ; p j ) ; j = 1; :::; T g. Under these conditions, we can generally de…ne collective rationalization as (with 0 n the n-vector of zeroes): De…nition 1. A pair of utility functions U 1 and U 2 provides a collective rationalization (CR-2) of the observed set S, if there exist T combinations of two vectors q 1 j and q 2 j , both 2 < n + , and a scalar j 2 < ++ such that:
(ii) 0
In this de…nition, U m (m = 1; 2) represents the utility function of household member m. Further, the j 's (j 2 f1; :::; T g) represent the 'bargaining power' of the di¤erent household members; see Browning and Chiappori (1998) for a detailed discussion. Finally, the vectors q 1 j , q 2 j and q j q 1 j q 2 j (j 2 f1; :::; T g) re ‡ect the intrahousehold allocation of total quantities to private (q 1 j and q 2 j ) and public q j q 1 j q 2 j consumption bundles.
Note further that De…nition 1 generalizes Chiappori's (1988; De…nition 5) collective rationalization de…nition by including public consumption. It provides a characterization of optimal bundles according to the weighted household utility function given in part (iii) of the de…nition. Optimality speci…cally refers to Pareto e¢ ciency at the level of the household, which appears from the weighting of the utilities of the two household members. This contrasts with the unitary case, where optimality indicates maximization of the (single-valued) household utility function.
Before entering into more formal results regarding De…nition 1, we de…ne a number of revealed preference concepts that will prove useful in our following discussion. generated by smoking might well outweigh that negative externality. In addition, within-household mechanisms may be instituted that decrease or even eliminate the negative externalities; see, e.g., the widespread practice of smoking outside in households consisting of smokers as well as non-smokers.
where DRP j represents the directly revealed preferred set associated with the bundle q j . Next, if q i 2 DRP k ; q k 2 DRP l ; :::; q z 2 DRP j for some sequence of observations (k; l; :::; z) then q i 2 RP j , where RP j represents the revealed preferred set associated with the bundle q j :
This de…nition indicates that consumption behaviour 'directly'reveals that the bundle q i is preferred over the bundle q j if the former bundle was chosen when the latter bundle was equally obtainable; i.e., p 0 i q i p 0 i q j ) q i 2 DRP j . The more general revealed preference notion builds upon this concept of direct revealed preference and additionally includes transitivity of the preferences. For brevity, we will indicate such a transitivity property as q i 2 DRP j ) (q i 2 RP j^R P i RP j ) in Section 4, where we deal with individual household members'preferences.
The next de…nition speci…es the unitary condition for rational household behaviour. 2 De…nition 3. A set of observations S satis…es the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if for all j 2 f1; :::; T g : p 0 j q j min
The implicit idea is that observation j 2 f1; :::; T g is (theoretically) utility maximizing under its budget constraint if and only if it is expenditure minimizing over its 'better than' set; in the (empirical) GARP condition this last set is approximated by the 'revealed preferred' set RP j : Varian (1982; p.948) demonstrated that (price and quantity) data consistency with the GARP at the level of the household as a whole is necessary and su¢ cient for observed household behaviour to be consistent with the unitary consumption model (i.e., for the existence of a utility function that rationalizes the consumption observations). We will repeatedly refer to this result in our following discussion.
Using De…nitions 2 and 3, we can establish the nonparametric conditions under which a CR-2 of a set S is possible. Proposition 1. There exists a pair of concave, monotonously increasing, continuous utility functions that provide a CR-2 of the observed set S if and only if there exist vectors q 1 j , q 2 j , 1 j , 2 j and H j (j = 1; :::; T ), all 2 < n + , with 0 n q m
Two notes are in order with respect to Proposition 1. First, following Chiappori (1988) , the di¤erent commodities may be interpreted as 'public goods', given that they all enter both individuals'utility functions. In a similar vein, the personalized prices k j and p j k j (k = 1; 2; H; j = 1; :::; T ) may be understood as 'Lindahl prices': they must add-up (over the household members) to the observed market prices in order to be consistent with Pareto e¢ ciency. Further, no qualitative distinction should be made between publicly and privately consumed commodities (where private consumption may be associated with externalities). Yet, there is a clear quantitative di¤erence: household members may accord another marginal valuation to private consumption than to public consumption; see the respective personalized (Lindahl) prices.
Second, it is interesting to compare the conditions in Proposition 1 to the standard rationality conditions in a unitary setting (see De…nition 3). Just like in the latter setting, the nonparametric characterization requires certain aspects of observed behaviour to obey the GARP conditions. Importantly, however, in the collective setting these GARP conditions apply to the price-quantity bundles of the individual household members (rather than to the price-quantity combination of the household as a whole). Contrary to the unitary case, these member-speci…c prices and quantities are usually unobserved. 3 Therefore, it is only imposed that there should exist at least one intrahousehold allocation that satis…es the above conditions.
The next result enables a further comparison with the unitary conditions for rational household behaviour. 4 Corollary 1. Suppose that there exist utility functions U 1 and U 2 that provide a CR-2 of the observed set S. Then for each combination of two observations (q i ; p i ) 2 S and
We recall that any two observations i and j that are characterized by p 0 i q i > p 0 i q j and p 0 j q j > p 0 j q i always imply a violation of the GARP, and thus a rejection of the unitary model; compare with De…nition 3. By contrast, it follows from Corollary 1 that such a data structure should not necessarily entail a rejection of collective rationality (see also our discussion of Lemma 1 in the next section). Still, under these data conditions one restriction is retained concerning the distribution of the household member utilities: it is generally impossible to conceive utilities such that each member in household observation i is 'better o¤'than the corresponding member in household observation j (i.e., U 1 i > U 1 j and U 2 i > U 2 j ) (or vice versa).
Falsifying the collective model
Using a Popperian argument, the general collective model in De…nition 1 would be intrinsically 'valueless'if any possible set of household observations meets its empirical conditions. Indeed, this would imply that the theory is not falsi…able. Our discussion of Corollary 1 illustrates the generally less restrictive nature of the collective model as compared to its unitary counterpart. A natural next question is then whether the collective model is falsi…able at all. This forms the subject of this section. Our …rst result provides minimal empirical conditions for rejecting collective rationality. Lemma 1. There always exist utility functions U 1 and U 2 that provide a CR-2 of the observed set S if (i) the number of commodities n 2 or (ii) the number of household observations T 2.
Hence, if we want to reject the CR-2 conditions, we will need at least three commodities and three observations. It is interesting to compare this …nding with the data structure in Corollary 1: such a data structure, which -to recall-su¢ ces for rejecting unitary rationality, is possible as soon as there are two commodities and two observations; Lemma 1 institutes that it is never possible to falsify the collective model under these data conditions. Next, it is worth to indicate that Chiappori (1990) and Shafer and Sonnenschein (1982) derive similar requirements regarding the minimal number of commodities in closely related contexts, namely the analysis of the aggregate demand for respectively collective goods and private goods.
The following result shows that the necessary empirical conditions derived from Lemma 1 are also su¢ cient.
Proposition 2. There do not always exist utility functions U 1 and U 2 that provide a CR-2 of the observed set S if and only if (i) the number of commodities n 3 and (ii) the number of observations T 3.
Thus, as soon as there are at least three commodities and three observations, the collective model can be falsi…ed or, in other words, empirically testing the collective model becomes meaningful. Interestingly, the lower bound of three commodities is actually below the lower bound derived by Browning and Chiappori (1998) in their parametric setting: their Proposition 4 implies that empirical falsi…cation of the (parametric) collective model (with two household members) necessitates at least …ve commodities. This suggests that the nonparametric approach presented here e¤ectively imposes weaker data requirements than its parametric counterpart.
As an illustration, we next provide a numerical price-quantity data structure with three goods and three observations that does not meet the CR-2 conditions. Example 1 (CR-2 falsi…cation). In the proof of Proposition 2 we establish that a CR-2 of the set S = f(q 1 ; p 1 ) ; (q 2 ; p 2 ) ; (q 3 ; p 3 )g is impossible if the following conditions are simultaneously met:
It is easily checked that these inequalities are generated by the following (three-dimensional) quantity and price vectors: 5
This example also illustrates that a possible rejection of collective rationality is essentially conditional upon the variation in the price and the quantity data. The same is actually true for the unitary model, but to a lesser extent. 6 In this respect, the di¤erence between the collective and the unitary model is illustrated by comparing the data structure (i)-(iii) in Example 1 with the structure in Corollary 1 (which su¢ ces to reject unitary rationality but not collective rationality).
Observable collective rationality restrictions
The su¢ cient condition for CR-2 rejection in Example 1 (see conditions (i)-(iii)) immediately institutes a necessary condition for data consistency with collective rationality. Interestingly, this necessary condition is expressed in terms of the available price and quantity data, while the necessary and su¢ cient conditions in Proposition 1 are in terms of unobservable personalized prices and quantities. This section derives general necessary and su¢ cient conditions in terms of observable price-quantity information.
Given the origins of nonparametric demand analysis in revealed preference theory, we explicitly anatomize the preference structure revealed by the available price-quantity data, to end up with restrictions on the observed prices and quantities that apply for the general case with T ( 3) observations. At this point, it is worth to indicate that our research question is formally similar to that addressed in the literature on (nonparametric) observable restrictions of market equilibrium behaviour (see, e.g., Carvajal et al., 2004, for a recent survey). That literature commonly uses semi-algebraic theory for quanti…er elimination. Still, a well-known limitation of these techniques is that they become computationally cumbersome in case of large data sets. 7 Given our focus on general T , we therefore do not opt for semi-algebraic theory in deriving testable restrictions for collective rationality.
We start with de…ning member-speci…c revealed preferred sets in terms of the (unobservable) personalized prices and quantities.
De…nition 4. Consider a speci…cation of the personalized prices and quantities (q 1 j ; q 2 j ; q j q 1 j q 2 j ; 1 j ; 2 j ; H j ) for all j 2 f1; :::; T g. Using For a given observation j 2 f1; :::; T g, the sets RP m j (m = 1; 2) are the (collective) member-speci…c analogues of the (unitary) revealed preferred set RP j in De…nition 2. Clearly, if the personalized prices and quantities were observed, then testing the collective rationality conditions would be formally equivalent to verifying the unitary conditions: in the collective setting, the unitary GARP condition in De…nition 3 should be ful…lled at the level of the individual household members; see the conditions (i) in Proposition 1.
Of course, the speci…cation of the sets DRP m j and RP m j will vary with the personalized price-quantity constellation. In this respect, our starting point is that the true personalized prices and quantities are usually unobservable. To conceive operational necessary and su¢ cient conditions in such a case, we construct inner bound approximations for the sets DRP m j (and, consequently, RP m j ), hereby exploiting the limited available price-quantity information. To do so, we …rst de…ne the general concept of observable directly revealed preferred sets. 8 De…nition 5. The sets d DRP j fq 1 ; :::; q T g ; j 2 f1; :::; T g ; represent a collection of observable directly revealed preferred sets if, for all feasible speci…cations of the personalized quantities and prices q 1 j ; q 2 j ; q j q 1 j q 2 j ; 1 j ; 2 j ; H j ; j 2 f1; :::; T g ; with
Thus, for any possible speci…cation of the personalized prices and quantities, the (observable) sets d DRP j fq 1 ; :::; q T g ; j 2 f1; :::; T g should be decomposable into member-speci…c sets d DRP m j (m = 1; 2) that provide inner bounds for the true directly revealed preferred sets DRP m j . In other words, these (empirical) sets approximate the (theoretical but unobservable) member-speci…c directly revealed preferred sets by accounting for all conceivable price-quantity intrahousehold scenarios -recall that each price-quantity scenario generally entails a di¤erent con…guration of the member-speci…c revealed preferred sets.
From an empirical point of view, a crucial question is whether we can provide an operational characterization of the sets d DRP j . Interestingly, we …nd that the 'maximal'
(collective) observable set of directly revealed preferred bundles is the (unitary) set DRP j (introduced in De…nition 2). This is contained in the following result.
Lemma 2. The collection of the sets DRP j ; j 2 f1; :::; T g constitutes a collection of observable directly revealed preferred sets. Moreover, we have d DRP j DRP j for any collection of observable directly revealed preferred sets d DRP j ; j 2 f1; :::; T g :
In the collective setting, the set DRP j has a subtly di¤erent interpretation than in the unitary setting. This di¤erence essentially pertains to the explicit recognition of the household's two-person nature in the collective approach. Speci…cally, it follows from our above discussion that
Intuitively, if q i has been chosen when q j was equally feasible, then at least one household member should prefer the (decomposed) former bundle above the (decomposed) latter bundle; this re ‡ects the Pareto e¢ cient nature of household behaviour in the collective model.
Because of Lemma 2, we can use DRP j as the starting point in our empirical conditions; this makes explicit the interrelationship between the unitary revealed preferred sets and the corresponding (observable) collective sets: In the unitary case, the GARP condition should be satis…ed (at the aggregate household level) for the sets RP j that follow from DRP j ; compare with De…nition 3. In the collective case, we can derive similar conditions, but now at the level of the individual household members. To do so, we …rst de…ne member-speci…c observable revealed preferred sets (starting from the set DRP j ): De…nition 6. The sets d RP m j fq 1 ; :::; q T g ; j 2 f1; :::; T g and m 2 f1; 2g ; represent a collection of observable member-speci…c revealed preferred sets if
Proposition 3 will state the necessary nature of properties (i)-(iv) for any collection of observable member-speci…c revealed preferred sets. The intuition of property (i) has been discussed above (following Lemma 2): we construct revealed preferred sets that (only) include observed directly revealed preferred bundles, i.e. DRP j = S m=1;2 d DRP m j . This construction should additionally respect the properties (ii)-(iv). Property (ii) reveals the transitivity idea that also underlies the De…nition 2 of the revealed preferred sets in the unitary model. The intuition of the other two properties directly relates to the multi-person nature of the collective household consumption model. First, property (iii) expresses that, if the household member m is indi¤erent between q i and q j , then the choice of q i (when q j was equally obtainable) can be rationalized only if the other member l prefers q i over q j . Next, the meaning of property (iv) is that, if q i can be 'exchanged'for the sum of q j 1 and q j 2 while the household member m has revealed its preference for q j 1 over q i , then the only possibility for rationalizing the choice of q i is that the other member l prefers q i to q j 2 : Basically, conditions (i) and (ii) re ‡ect the empirical implications of rational household behaviour for one and the same household member ; they are formally similar to the unitary conditions. The conditions (iii) and (iv) (as well as the following necessary and su¢ cient conditions) then pertain to rationality across household members; this distinguishes the collective setting from the unitary setting.
Using De…nition 6, we have the following necessary condition for collective rationality.
Proposition 3.
A necessary condition for the existence of utility functions U 1 and U 2 that provide a CR-2 of the observed set S is that there exists a collection of observable revealed preferred sets d RP m j (m = 1; 2) ; j 2 f1; :::; T g such that p 0 j q j min R j 2R j P qr2R j p 0 j q r where R j is the set of sets
For given (observable) member-speci…c revealed preferred sets, this condition checks all possible sets R j containing a combination of consumption bundles q r 1 2 d RP 1 j and q r 2 2 d RP 2 j ; the set R j represents the collection of all such R j . The interpretation of the necessary condition is then complementary to that of property (iv) in De…nition 6: if household members 1 and 2 reveal that they prefer respectively q r 1 and q r 2 over q j , then the choice of q j can be rationalized only if it cannot be exchanged for the sum of q r 1 and q r 2 (or, stricto sensu, under the prices p j the bundle q j should not be associated with a strictly higher expenditure level than the sum q r 1 + q r 2 ). In general, a set R j will consist of two di¤erent consumption bundles. Still, it may reduce to a singleton in the special case where both members have revealed their preference for the same bundle q r over q j (i.e., q r 2 d RP m j for m = 1 and 2); in that situation, the condition states that q j should not be exchangeable for that (single) bundle q r .
The complementary su¢ ciency condition is as follows. 10 1 0 In fact, it is fairly easy to verify that the necessary condition in Proposition 3 is also su¢ cient for 
To interpret this condition, we introduce the concept of 'situation-dependent totalitarianism' (see also the proof of the result): when labelling the unitary model as 'totalitarian' (i.e., one and the same household member always has the full decision power), 'situation-dependent' totalitarianism indicates that the identity of the household member with full decision power may vary according to the speci…c situation. 11 In that interpretation, all observations in the set N m (m = 1; 2) have the household member m as the totalitarian decision maker; and the closing su¢ ciency condition then states that each situation-dependent (totalitarian) decision maker should act rationally, i.e., cost minimizing over the corresponding revealed preferred set. The additional restriction 8i; j 2 N m :
indicates that, if household member m is the decision maker in situations i and j, then the choice of q i when q j was equally obtainable under the prices p i can be rationalized only if
To test data consistency with these observable (necessity and su¢ ciency) requirements, one may use an iterative procedure that extends the Warshall algorithm proposed by Varian (1982, p. 949) for testing the unitary GARP condition. Speci…cally, one should verify the closing conditions in Propositions 3 and 4 for each possible con…g-uration of the member-speci…c directly revealed preferred sets (that is consistent with the properties (i)-(iv) in De…nition 6).
The fact that these (observable) collective rationality restrictions have a formally analogous structure as the (unitary) GARP restrictions should allow for easy adaptations of the Bronars (1987) and Varian (1990 Varian ( , 1993 ideas concerning the construction of power and goodness-of-…t measures for nonparametric consumption models. Speci…-cally, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions may generate upper and lower bounds for each of these measures. (If the upper and lower bounds of these power and goodnessof-…t measures are generally situated close to each other, one possible interpretation is that the empirical content of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions is practically the same for the speci…c data under study.)
Clearly, the empirical implications of the necessary condition in Proposition 3 will generally deviate from those of the su¢ cient condition in Proposition 4. This di¤erence re ‡ects our non-speci…cation of the (unobservable) personalized prices and quantities. This contrasts, e.g., with the unitary case, where all price and quantity information is observable and the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for household consumption rationality do coincide (see De…nition 3). In fact, as we will discuss in the following section, this unitary model may be considered as a special case of the collective model, namely when there is a single household member. In that case, the personalized prices equal the observed market prices, and the associated (collective) necessary and su¢ cient conditions turn out the same.
Even though the necessary condition in Proposition 3 should not generally coincide with the su¢ cient condition in Proposition 4, we may expect the former condition to 'converge' towards the latter condition when the sample size increases. 12 The associated 'convergence rate'will then of course depend (positively) upon the price-quantity variation in the data and, hence, we may expect it to increase with the number of consumption commodities. 13 But, in general, we can safely argue that the empirical implications of the fairly rudimentary 'situation-dependent totalitarian'solution (see the su¢ cient condition) will get closer to those of any more re…ned intrahousehold decision process (see the necessary condition) when the sample size increases.
To conclude, we see at least two possibilities for conceiving more stringent collective rationality tests, which should then incorporate additional speci…cations of the memberspeci…c prices and quantities. (Formally, such speci…cations will result in extra requirements regarding the construction of the (observable) member-speci…c revealed preferred sets, and in sharper (observable) closing necessary/su¢ cient conditions.) First, if the data are consistent with the necessary conditions in Proposition 3 (but possibly not with the su¢ cient condition in Proposition 4), then a following step may apply a heuristic 'trial and error'procedure to recover (household-speci…c) information regarding the personalized prices and quantities. This second step procedure may be based on reasonable a priori's, which pertain to (i) the division of the consumption over household members and over private and public consumption (including the identi…cation of private and public goods) and (ii) the speci…cation of the personalized prices. (Evidently, sensitivity 1 d RP m j coincide by construction.) 1 3 Generally, the speed of 'convergence' will depend upon the speci…c data generating process that underlies the aggregate household consumption data (i.e., basically the prices and household means, which in turn determine the observed quantity data for some given intrahousehold allocation process).
analysis can be appropriate in practical applications.)
Alternatively, one may apply nested hypothesis testing, based on additional theoretical assumptions. That is, one complements the …rst step veri…cation of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions in Propositions 3 and 4 by testing strengthened rationality conditions that put additional (general) structure on the household decision process. Our discussion in Section 6 suggests a number of possibilities in this direction. Of course, one may combine the heuristic and the nested hypothesis approaches: if some (general) nested hypothesis cannot be rejected, then a heuristic procedure may recover further (household-speci…c) information within that special/nested setting. See, e.g., Cherchye and Vermeulen (2003) , who supplement such an approach with a goodness-of-…t and a power analysis of the collective model (within a labour supply setting with egoistic agents).
Many-person households
The above discussion restricts to two-person households. In this section, we consider the case with M household members. Note that this general case includes the two-person model discussed above (i.e., M = 2) and the unitary model (i.e., M = 1) as special cases.
A household's observed vector of commodities q is now decomposed into M bundles q m (m = 1; :::; M ) that capture private consumption and a bundle Q that represents public consumption. The di¤erent consumption vectors are interrelated as follows:
Each household member m (m = 1; :::; M ) is further characterized by own preferences that are represented by a utility function U m q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q M ; Q that is monotonously increasing in its arguments.
As was the case for two-person households, we merely assume that the empirical analyst observes a set of T quantity-price combinations, which we denote as S = f(q j ; p j ) ; j = 1; :::; T g. We can then generalize De…nition 1. 
Analogous to the couples' case, optimal intrahousehold allocations result from the maximization of a weighted utility function, with weights representing the bargaining power of the individual household members. Once more, optimality is to be understood in a Pareto sense.
The associated rationalization conditions are contained in the following result. such that for each i; j 2 f1; :::; T g :
; :::;
Hence, for a CR-M to be possible, each household member's behaviour has to concur with the GARP. Speci…cally, such GARP consistency should hold for a situation where, in every household, each individual member is confronted with an own vector of personalized (Lindahl) prices that add up (over the di¤erent members) to the observed market prices. Again, the intrahousehold distribution of the consumption quantities and the personalized prices are assumed to be unobserved, implying that there should exist at least one combination of individual consumption bundles and personalized prices that meet these conditions.
We next establish the general counterpart to Corollary 1.
Corollary 2. Suppose that there exist utility functions U 1 ; :::; U M that provide a CR-M of the observed set S. Then for each combination of two observations (q i ; p i ) 2 S and (q j ; p j ) 2 S such that p 0 i q i > p 0 i q j and p 0 j q j > p 0 j q i , we obtain: As discussed earlier, the price-quantity situation in Corollary 2 always entails a rejection of the GARP. But again, such a data structure need not be inconsistent with the CR-M conditions. Yet, similarly as before, one implication is that it becomes impossible to construct a distribution of the household members' utilities such that every member in one household observation is associated with a higher utility level than the corresponding member in the other household observation.
Let us then regard the minimal empirical conditions for possible falsi…cation of the CR-M conditions. These are given in the following result, which generalizes Proposition 2.
Proposition 6. There do not always exist utility functions U 1 ; :::; U M that provide a CR-M of the observed set S if and only if (i) the number of commodities n M + 1 and (ii) the number of observations T M + 1.
In words, as soon as there are more commodities and observations than household members, the collective model can be falsi…ed. If one of the conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 6 is not ful…lled, then one can always …nd individual utility functions that provide a rationalization of any observed household behaviour. Analogously as before, the minimal requirement on the number of commodities is less stringent than the one instituted by Browning and Chiappori (1998, Proposition 6) for their parametric model of M -person households.
To further illustrate, we next provide a general price-quantity data structure that cannot be collectively rationalized.
Example 2 (CR-M falsi…cation).
In the proof of Proposition 6, we establish that a CR-M of the set S = f(q j ; p j ) ; j = 1; :::; M + 1g is impossible if the following conditions are met:
(i) 8j 2 f1; :::; M + 1g :
We investigate these conditions for p j 2 < 
it is easy to see that for all q > M there exists p such that (ii) is met.
To give a numerical example, we reject collective rationality for M = 5 if q = 10 and p = 14. Similar constructions are conceivable for alternative M values.
The same two quali…cations apply as with respect to Example 1. First, the example makes clear that possible rejection of collective rationality e¤ectively depends upon the variation in the price and the quantity data. Second, the su¢ cient condition for CR-M rejection institutes a necessary condition for data consistency with collective rationality. Like in Section 4, we can derive closely related necessary and su¢ cient conditions in terms of observed prices and quantities, as we discuss next.
As a …rst step, we can establish a similar result as Lemma 2 which, for each j 2 f1; :::; T g ; institutes the set DRP j (in De…nition 2) as the 'maximal' observable set of directly revealed preferred bundles for any household member m 2 f1; ::; M g. (For compactness, we abstract from a formal statement, but the analogy with the two-person case is easy.) Using this, we may de…ne member-speci…c observable revealed preferred sets. The interpretation of the di¤erent properties in this de…nition is directly analogous to that of the similar properties in De…nition 6 for the case M = 2. We can now state the following necessary condition for collective rationality. This necessary condition has a directly similar interpretation as its two-person analogue: if each household member m 2 f1; :::; M g reveals its preference for q rm over q j ; then it should not be possible to exchange q j for the combination of these preferred bundles under the prices p j . It is easy to verify that this condition reduces to the unitary GARP condition for M = 1 (i.e., there is only one household member); compare with De…nition 3.
We next de…ne the su¢ ciency condition. 
Like in the two-person case, this su¢ cient condition should be interpreted in terms of the situation-dependent totalitarian construction that it enables; see also our discussion of Proposition 4. Just like the necessity condition, the su¢ ciency condition reduces to the GARP condition for M = 1. In that case, the (member-speci…c) personalized prices and quantities are the observed (aggregate household) prices and quantities, and the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for rational household behaviour always coincide. In the more general case (i.e., M > 1), we may expect the necessity condition to converge towards the su¢ ciency condition when the sample size increases; compare with our discussion in Section 4.
Empirical implementation of these necessary and su¢ cient M -person conditions is subject to the same quali…cations as in the two-person case. First, an extension of Varian's (1982) Warshall algorithm may test the conditions. Next, the conditions may be used for computing upper and lower bounds for nonparametric power and goodness-of…t measures (see respectively Bronars, 1987 , and Varian, 1990 , 1993 . Finally, inducing additional structure on the personalized prices and quantities (e.g., following a heuristic and/or a nested hypothesis approach) may entail sharper necessity and su¢ ciency conditions. We again refer to our discussion in Section 4.
Special cases
So far, we have focussed on a most general collective household consumption model, which comprises a multitude of behavioural models as special cases. In the current section, we discuss a number of interesting variants that involve additional structure on either the household decision making process or the data availability. As each of these models introduces additional prior information regarding the analytical problem at hand, we may generally expect (i) less stringent restrictions on the number of commodities and observations, and (ii) more stringent (observable) necessary and su¢ cient conditions for data consistency with the model's implications. These conditions may be obtained along similar lines as in Sections 3 and 4 (for two-person households) and 5 (for many-person households). (Formally, these special cases involve additional restrictions regarding the personalized prices and quantities in the general model. The corresponding extension of the results in Sections 3, 4 and 5 essentially boils down to including those extra contraints in the derivation of the respective empirical conditions.)
To keep the exposition simple, we restrict the following discussion to the two-person household (M = 2). Still, the discussion is easily extended towards settings with M > 2.
Example 3 (egoistic household members and no public consumption). In the case of egoistic agents, the utility of each household member depends solely on her or his own private consumption (e.g., Chiappori, 1988) . This implies the additional restriction that (in Proposition 1) 1 j = p j and 2 j = 0 n . The absence of public consumption further makes that q 2 j = q j q 1 j . 14;15
Example 4 (unitary household decision making). In the unitary model, the household is assumed to maximize a single utility function subject to the household budget constraint. The associated restrictions are obtained from those in Proposition 1 by adding 1 j = 2 j = H j = (1=2) p j ; this makes the constraints for household members 1 and 2 coincide, hereby …ltering out the impact of the di¤erent consumption vectors q 1 j , q 2 j and q j q 1 j q 2 j (j = 1; :::; T ). When the personalized prices of the di¤erent household members are the same, the empirical restrictions of the (in casu two-person) collective model and the unitary model are indistinguishable.
Example 5 (intrahousehold allocation is known for some commodities). If the private/public consumption of some commodities is observed, then we can de…ne the partitioned vector q j = q O0 j ; q U 0 j 0 , with q O j capturing the commodities for which the intrahousehold allocation is observed and q U j containing the other commodities. In this case, the endogenously determined intrahousehold allocation vectors in Proposition 1 q 1 j , q 2 j and q j q 1 j q 2 j should be de…ned solely with respect to q U j . The collective labour supply model of Chiappori (1988) can be considered as an illustration. In that setting, 1 4 Evidently, the intermediate case in which there is no public consumption and preferences are nonegoistic is also possible. In that situation, the quantity constraint q 1 5 Given that our proof of Lemma 1 focuses on the special case of egoistic agents and no public consumption, the minimal data requirement in Proposition 2 remains valid as long as no information is available about the (price-and quantity-) intrahousehold allocation. See Chiappori (1988, p. 76-77) for a numerical example where the intrahoushold allocation for two goods (in casu the leisure consumption of both members in a couple) is observed. As that example makes clear, weaker data requirements apply in such a case: Chiappori rejects collective rationality with only two household observations. the intrahousehold allocation of leisure is observed, while the private consumption of a Hicksian aggregate consumption good remains unobserved.
To conclude, it is worth to indicate that other variants of this special case may be conceived. For example, it may well be that only part of the private consumption of some commodities is observed, while the total expenditures on that commodity are not observed; see, e.g., the data set described by Bonke and Browning (2003) . The observed expenditure parts imply lower bounds for the corresponding components of the vectors q 1 j and q 2 j in Proposition 1.
As a …nal note, we stress that the special cases above do all but exhaust the generality of the presented collective model. Furthermore, combinations of the variants are equally possible. For example, one may consider egoistic household members (see Example 3) where the intrahousehold allocation is observed for some goods (see Example 5); Chiappori's (1988) collective labour setting with egoistic agents serves as an example.
Concluding remarks
We have presented a nonparametric characterization of a general collective model, which builds upon minimal assumptions regarding the preferences of the household members. More speci…cally, it allows for both public consumption within the household and (positive) consumption externalities. Moreover, it only assumes that the empirical analyst observes the aggregate household consumption quantities and prices; it makes no further assumptions regarding the observability of the individually consumed quantities and the personalized (Lindahl) prices associated with each household member. Attractively, the model encompasses a large variety of alternative behavioural models as special cases, including the traditional unitary model and the collective model à la Chiappori (1988) .
We have derived conditions regarding the minimal number of observations and commodities to enable empirical rejection of the theoretical implications of the model. Speci…cally, we have shown that the model can be falsi…ed as soon as there is one more commodity and one more household observation than the number of household members. Interestingly, these empirical requirements are generally less stringent than those obtained by Browning and Chiappori (1998) in their comparable parametric setting. Finally, it is evident that the special cases discussed in Section 6 (which impose additional structure on the analytical problem at hand) may involve even less stringent empirical requirements with respect to the number of commodities and observations.
Turning to the empirical testing of the model, we have established operational necessary and su¢ cient conditions for collective rationality of the data, which solely use observable price and quantity information. These conditions have an analogous structure as the GARP condition that applies to the unitary model. This makes that the collective model is empirically testable by means of iterative algorithms that are formally similar to those proposed by Varian (1982) for the unitary model. Furthermore, it enables easy adaptations of GARP -based concepts that were originally proposed in a unitary context (such as Varian's (1990 Varian's ( , 1993 goodness-of-…t idea and Bronars'(1987) power notion). Again, we may generally expect sharper necessary and su¢ cient data conditions to be associated with the special cases in Section 6.
Apart from the mere testing of the collective model, it may be interesting to additionally address recoverability issues within the nonparametric tradition. The associated results may subsequently be useful for the (nonparametric) prediction of household behaviour in new situations and/or welfare analysis. See Varian (1982) 
Given the speci…city of the collective orientation, a …rst type of recoverability questions may relate to the intrahousehold allocation process itself. For example, one may be interested in the number of household members that are e¤ectively involved in the household allocation process. 16 That is, how many household decision makers have to be accounted for in order to make observed behaviour consistent with collective rationality? (Compare with Dauphin and Fortin (2001) , who address a similar question in a parametric setting.) In this respect, one may interpret the M -person collective tests as checking the hypothesis that there are M household members (with utility functions that cannot be aggregated in a single well-behaved utility function) that have 'decision power'within the household allocation process; private consumption of the household members without any bargaining power (e.g., young children) is then taken up in the household's public consumption. Hence, one potentially fruitful procedure compares test results for di¤erent M values (with M the e¤ective number of household members); for example: M = 1 obtains the unitary rationalization tests, and M = 2 obtains the setting discussed in Section 2.
Alternative recoverability questions may pertain to speci…c properties of the utility functions of the individual household members. For example, one may test whether observed household behaviour is consistent with egoistic or altruistic preferences. Other tests that have been applied in a (nonparametric) unitary framework (see, e.g., Varian, 1982 Varian, , 1983 ) may equally be adapted to the collective setting presented in this study.
Given concavity, both individual utility functions are subdi¤erentiable, which carries over to their weighted sum U 1 + j U 2 ; an optimal solution to the above maximization problem should therefore satisfy 18
where U m q k is a subgradient of the utility function U m (m = 1; 2) de…ned for the vector q k (k = 1; 2; H) and evaluated at q 1 j ; q 2 j ; q H j , while j represents the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
Next, concavity of the functions U 1 and U 2 implies:
obtains the conditions (ii) of the proposition.
(ii; su¢ ciency) We next prove that data consistency with conditions (ii) implies the existence of a pair of concave, strictly monotonic and continuous utility functions that provide a CR-2 of the data. As a …rst step, we de…ne (using q H j = q j q 1 j q 2 j (j = 1; :::; T ) to simplify the notation)
and
Without losing generality, we concentrate on j = 1 j = 2 j , which obtains
Since p 0 j q 1 + q 2 + q H p 0 j q 1 j + q 2 j + q H j , we thus have
which proves that q 1 j ; q 2 j ; q H j maximizes U 1 q 1 ; q 2 ; q H + j U 2 q 1 ; q 2 ; q H subject to p 0 j q 1 + q 2 + q H p 0 j q j . We conclude that the functions U 1 and U 2 in (A.6) and (A.7) provide a CR-2 of the data. These functions are concave, monotonously increasing and continuous (see again Varian, 1982) .
B. Proof of Corollary 1
As a …rst step, we note that consistency with the CR-2 conditions necessarily implies
this follows from combining the conditions (ii) of Proposition 1.
Using that 0 > p 0 j (q i q j ), 0 > p 0 i (q j q i ) and m k > 0 (k = i; j; m = 1; 2), we obtain
We thus have
k (see the proof of Proposition 1) gives the result.
C. Proof of Lemma 1
(i) We …rst show that there always exist utility functions U 1 and U 2 that provide a CR-2 of the observed set S if the number of commodities n 2. We concentrate on n = 2; if the CR-2 conditions always hold in this case, then they certainly also hold for n = 1. Without losing generality, for each j 2 f1; :::; T g we concentrate on 1 j = p j and 2 j = 0 2 ; next, we consider q 2 j = q j q 1 j . (This actually boils down to the case of egoistic household members and no public consumption; see our discussion of Example 3 in Section 6.) This gives the simpli…ed CR-2 requirement (see the conditions (i) of Proposition 1): the data q 1 j ; q j q 1 j ; p j ; 0 2 and q 1 j ; q j q 1 j ; 0 2 ; p j (j = 1; :::; T ) should both satisfy the GARP conditions.
Next, we use that the price and quantity vectors are two-dimensional, i.e. (for j = 1; :::; T )
Now consider the allocation where each household j 2 f1; :::; T g allocates the …rst (second) commodity exclusively to the …rst (second) household member, i.e.
Under these intrahousehold allocations (which -to recall-cannot be excluded a priori ), the GARP conditions stated above are always satis…ed. For example, for the …rst household member data consistency with the GARP requires for each pair of observations i; z 2 f1; :::; T g: if p i q i p i q j ; p j q j p j q k ; :::; p y q y p y q z for some sequence of observations (j; k; :::; y), then p z q z p z q i ; compare with De…nition 3: This requirement is automatically satis…ed because of the scalar nature of the p j and q j (j 2 f1; :::; T g), i.e. p i q i p i q j ; p j q j p j q k ; :::; p y q y p y q z (i; j; k; :::; y; z 2 f1; :::; T g) ,
A straightforwardly analogous reasoning applies to the second household member. We may thus conclude that it is always possible to construct U 1 and U 2 that provide a CR-2 of the observed set S for n = 2:
(ii) We next show that there always exist utility functions U 1 and U 2 that provide a CR-2 of the observed set S if the number of household observations T 2. We concentrate on T = 2; if the CR-2 conditions always hold in this case, then they certainly also hold for T = 1. Further, we again assume egoistic household members and no public consumption, which gives the simpli…ed CR-2 requirement: the data q 1 j ; q j q 1 j ; p j ; 0 n and q 1 j ; q j q 1 j ; 0 n ; p j (j = 1; 2) should both satisfy the GARP conditions.
These GARP conditions will always be satis…ed under the intrahousehold allocations q 1 1 = q 1 q 2 1 = 0 n and q 1 2 = 0 n q 2 2 = q 2 (which cannot be excluded a priori ). For example, for the …rst household member we have Given that a directly analogous argument holds for the second household member, we may conclude that it is always possible to construct U 1 and U 2 that provide a CR-2 of the observed set S for T = 2:
D. Proof of Proposition 2
(We note that the result also follows directly from Propositions 3 and 6 (M -person households). Still, we believe that including a separate proof is instructive as an intermediate step in building up towards these further results.) (i; necessity) It follows from Lemma 1 that we need at least three commodities and three observations to enable inconsistency with the CR-2 conditions.
(ii; su¢ ciency) We show that a CR-2 of the set S = f(q 1 ; p 1 ) ; (q 2 ; p 2 ) ; (q 3 ; p 3 )g is impossible if the following conditions are simultaneously met:
As a …rst step, we rewrite the CR-2 conditions (ii) of Proposition 1 as (for each i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g)
where
Note that 8i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g : 0 
Similarly, from (D.5) and U 2 3 U 2 2 we obtain
Combining (D.6) and (D.7) gives
which provides a lower bound for 0
, an upper bound is given by
From (D.8) and (D.9), we derive the necessary condition for a CR-2 of the set S p 0 2 q 2 p 0 2 (q 1 + q 3 ) ; which con ‡icts with the property (D.2) of the price-quantity structure under consideration.
Clearly, an analogous argument applies to any possible ordering of U 1 1 ; U 1 2 ; U 1 3 and U 2 3 ; U 2 2 ; U 2 1 . We thus conclude that it is impossible to construct U 1 and U 2 that provide a CR-2 of a set S that satis…es (D.1)-(D.3). It is easy to verify that these conditions can never be met if there are only two commodities. Example 1 ('CR-2 falsi…cation') demonstrates that such a data structure is possible if there are 3 commodities. This shows su¢ ciency for (at least) 3 observations and (at least) 3 commodities.
E. Proof of Lemma 2
(i) As a preliminary step, we note that q i 2 d DRP j is equivalent to: for all i ; b q k (k = i; j) that satisfy the restrictions in Proposition 1, we have
this rephrases De…nition 5.
(ii) We …rst derive that the collection of the sets DRP j ; j 2 f1; :::; T g is a collection of observable directly revealed preferred sets. The result follows from the fact that p 0 i q i p 0 i q j is incompatible with the existence of some i ; b
Indeed, summing these last inequalities immediately yields p 0 i q i < p 0 i q j ; whence we may conclude
(iii) We next establish that d DRP j DRP j for any collection of observable directly revealed preferred sets d DRP j ; j 2 f1; :::; T g : The result is obtained by noting that
F. Proof of Proposition 3
Consider an arbitrary speci…cation of the personalized prices and quantities k and b q k (k 2 f1; :::; T g) de…ned as in (E.1), which entails the (member-speci…c) directly revealed preferred sets DRP m k (for i 2 f1; :::; T g) :
where b p i is again de…ned as in (E.1). This in turn implies the sets RP m j ; see De…nition 4. We prove the necessity condition by establishing that these sets are consistent with the (direct analogues of the) properties (i)-(iv) in De…nition 6 and the necessary condition in Proposition 3 when the data meet the CR-2 conditions in Proposition 1. These properties carry over to the ('inner bound') observable sets d DRP Property (i) follows directly from Lemma 2. Next, Property (ii) easily follows from the transitivity relationships implied by the GARP requirements (at the level of the individual household members) in the conditions (i) of Proposition 1.
As for property (iii), we …rst recall that property (i) implies that q j 2 d DRP m i (m 2 f1; 2g) only if q j 2 DRP i or p 0 j q j p 0 j q i . Using this, we should establish
Under consistency with the CR-2 conditions, b
, which gives the result: To derive property (iv), suppose that p 0
: On the one hand,
for the data to be consistent with the CR-2 conditions. Combining these two inequalities would imply
if q r 1 6 = q r 2 and, similarly, p 0 j q j p 0 j q r if q r 1 = q r 2 = q r : The observation that such an inequality should hold for any combination b q r 1 2 RP 1 j and b q r 2 2 RP 2 j then immediately entails the stated necessary condition for collective rationality:
G. Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that there exists a collection of observable revealed preferred sets d RP (As for the intuition, when labelling the unitary model as 'totalitarian' (i.e., a single decision maker has total decision power in all instances), one may interpret the constellation (G.1)-(G.3) as 'situation-dependent' totalitarianism: dependent on the speci…c situation at hand either the …rst or the second household member is in full decision power. See also our discussion in the main text.) It now su¢ ces to prove that under the intrahousehold price-quantity allocations (G.1)-(G.3) the GARP conditions (i) in Proposition 1 are always satis…ed. 19 For the sake of brevity, we restrict attention to the …rst household member; but a directly analogous reasoning applies to the second household member. The GARP requirement states that Using that 8 k 1 ; k 2 2 b N 1 : p 0 
H. Proof of Proposition 5
The construction of the proof is directly analogous to that of Proposition 1.
I. Proof of Corollary 2
The construction of the proof is directly analogous to that of Corollary 1.
J. Proof of Proposition 6
(i; necessity) The result that we need at least M + 1 commodities and M + 1 goods for inconsistency with the CR-M conditions can be proven in analogous manner as Lemma 1. We only sketch the basic intuition for the result that there is always data consistency with the CR-M conditions if n = M or T = M . First, consistency with the CR-M conditions for M commodities can always be achieved for an intrahousehold allocation with each i-th (i 2 f1; :::; M g) household member consuming exclusively the i-th commodity (and no public consumption); this yields a situation that is formally similar to that discussed in part (i) in the proof of Lemma 1. Next, consistency with the CR-M conditions for M observations can always be achieved for an intrahousehold allocation with each i-th (i 2 f1; :::; M g) household member consuming everything in the i-th household observation; this yields a situation that is formally similar to that discussed in part (ii) in the proof of Lemma 1.
(ii; su¢ ciency) We show that a CR-M of the set S = f(q j ; p j ) ; j = 1; :::; M + 1g is impossible if the following conditions are met: which con ‡icts with the property (J.1) of the price-quantity structure under consideration.
We conclude that it is impossible to construct U 1 ; :::; U M that provide a CR-M of a set S that satis…es (J.1). This shows su¢ ciency for (at least) M + 1 observations. Example 2 ('CR-M falsi…cation') demonstrates that the conditions (J.1) are possible if there are M + 1 commodities.
K. Proof of Proposition 7
The construction of the proof is directly analogous to that of Proposition 3.
L. Proof of Proposition 8
It can be shown that, if 8 j 2 f1; :::; T g : 
